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Abstract
Cyber-physical systems are increasingly prevalent in daily life. Smart grids in
particular are becoming more interconnected and autonomously operated. Despite
the advantages, new challenges arise in the form of defending these assets. Recent
studies reveal that small-scale, coordinated cyber-attacks on only a few substations
across the U.S. could result in cascading failures affecting the entire nation. In support
of defending critical infrastructure, this thesis tests the fault tolerance of a backup
protection system. Each transmission line in the system incorporates autonomous
agents which monitor the status of the line and make decisions regarding the safety
of the grid. Various malfunctions that could occur from real-life attacks are simulated
in the grid with the intent of determining its ability to successfully respond to faults
despite adversity. The SPIN model checker is used to execute all combinations of fault
location and malfunctions to determine which types can occur, and how many, before
the system is unable to properly clear a fault. With results analyzed, the decision
making process of the model is revised to increase its fault tolerance.
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TESTING THE FAULT TOLERANCE OF A WIDE AREA BACKUP
PROTECTION SYSTEM USING SPIN
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The instantaneous access to electricity with the flick of a switch is a technological
marvel. Electricity is delivered to the user at the proper voltage and frequency without
so much as an afterthought. Yet, this is only possible through the extensive design
and installation of generators, transformers, sensors, switches, and transmission lines
which all operate cohesively [3]. Due to our dependency on a reliable energy source
for day-to-day activities, severe consequences may result when equipment within this
complex network experiences failure. For example, the Northeast Blackout of 2003
caused a few billion dollars in infrastructural damage, leaving an estimated 50 million
people without power. There are also social costs to consider that can’t be measured
with a dollar amount, such as massive traffic congestion, businesses closing, and
communication channels being rendered useless [4]. This catastrophe was caused
by the domino effect of a few small transmission line failures, which reinforces the
conclusions made by a 2014 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) study
regarding the vulnerability of the US power grid system [5].
While we may not be aware of it, our electrical infrastructure faces constant
adversity. This may come in the form of operator error, equipment malfunction, or
extreme weather. An additional aspect to consider that is becoming increasingly
relevant is the cyber security of our critical infrastructure [6]. New technologies
1
have been incorporated into power protection systems, allowing autonomous, wide-
area networking. However, this comes with associated risks. For example, using
digital relays instead of mechanical relays opens the possibility of cyber-based attacks.
Compared to threats due to natural causes that at least require physical proximity,
cyber intrusions are more uncertain since they can be executed from any range [7].
To combat cases of primary protection failure and cascading effects, various layers
of backup protection are interwoven into grids. “Protection” in the context of power
engineering does not refer to the ability to prevent abnormal activity from happening.
Rather, it refers to the ability to minimize damage and other factors once abnormal
conditions have been detected. Equipment is designed such that power systems are
resilient in the face of challenge. This is known as protective relaying [8].
Despite the integration of backup protection, power grid systems still have flaws.
Researchers and engineers have investigated backup protection systems to improve
their resiliency. One way to measure the resiliency of these systems is through ad-
versarial thinking. Adversarial thinking, the strategic approach of putting oneself in
the shoes of the attacker, has been heavily studied with regards to cyber security
and game theory [9, 10]. While power grid systems don’t always face threats from a
human attacker, this method of thinking still applies. By predicting what types of
danger these systems can face, then evaluating all possible outcomes, resiliency can
be assessed and improved.
1.2 Problem Statement
Backup protection systems employing autonomous protective relays have varying
degrees of tolerance. Testing a system’s fault tolerance with an exhaustive search
of failure scenarios reveals weaknesses. When taking into consideration the inter-
dependencies between autonomous agents, this task is combinatorically massive. In
2
this thesis, the SPIN model checker is used to explore all possible failure scenarios of
a backup protection system. With patterns analyzed, recommendations are made to
improve the resiliency of the system.
1.3 Research Questions
In this thesis, the following three questions are investigated.
• RQ1: How can the model checking approach be applied to test the fault tolerance
of a backup protection system?
• RQ2: What specific vulnerabilities lie within the backup protection system?
• RQ3: Using the model checking approach, what improvements can be made to
the model to increase its resiliency?
1.4 Organization
This thesis is sectioned as follows.
Chapter II provides a background on the various types of protection relays found
within power grid systems and how they function, the specific backup protection
system being examined, and the application of SPIN. It also discusses related work
regarding other uses of model checkers.
Chapter III examines the methodology of how the fault tolerance of the grid is
tested. Specifically, what variables are used in the experiment, the steps that SPIN
takes when executed, limitations of the model, and assumptions made.
Chapter IV discusses results of this experiment. The results are analyzed to deter-
mine what combinations of malfunctions are required to cause the backup protection
system to fail. With failure conditions examined, a revision is made to the decision
making process of the model to improve its fault tolerance.
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Chapter V provides concluding remarks on the research accomplished, states po-
tential avenues for future work, and discusses the research questions presented in
1.3.
4
II. Literature Review
This chapter presents a thorough background on the topics relevant to this thesis;
namely, backup protection and the model checking approach. It covers the use of
protection relays, the specific backup protection system used for this research, the
application of model checking, and SPIN.
2.1 Protection Relays
Protection relays are embedded within electric distribution circuits that are de-
signed to detect power system conditions of an abnormal or dangerous nature, and
report the activity [11]. They are typically located in substations and protect the
transmission lines connecting those substations. Protective relays are configured to
detect specific types of dangerous activity, such as a short circuit or voltage dip. In-
telligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) are autonomous agents which compile information
about current, voltage, or frequency from these relays, and make decisions regarding
the safety of the power grid [12, 13]. This information is communicated across agents
to ensure wide-area protection [14].
When IEDs sense any abnormal state on a transmission line, they send a message
to the circuit breaker. The circuit breaker interrupts the flow of current through the
line. With no current, the affected area is isolated, preventing any further equipment
damage [15]. This is known as “tripping” a line. There are two types of protective
relays that are relevant to this research. These are distance relays, and directional
relays.
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2.2 Distance Relays
Distance relays function by observing the impedance of a line. Impedance is a
measure of the opposition a line provides to the current flowing through it when
voltage is applied. Since impedance and current are inversely related, a drop in
impedance results in a rise in current. If a line’s impedance falls below a certain
threshold, a distance relay determines that a fault has occurred. Within the context
of this experiment, a fault is assumed to be a short circuit.
Impedance is not constant. It varies due to many factors, such as length and
temperature of the line. As a result of constant variation, different zones of protection
are employed in distance relays. There are primary and secondary zones, which are
referred to as Zones 1 and 2.
Traditionally, a Zone 1 distance relay is set to cover the first 70-90% of the line
length [16, 17]. When a fault is detected, the relay reacts instantly and sends a
command to trip the line. The distance covered intentionally falls short of the entire
length of the line. Since impedance varies, a Zone 1 relay set to cover exactly 100%
of the line length may over reach and detect a fault on the next line. In this scenario,
the relay would mistakenly trip the local line, where a fault hasn’t occurred. Setting
the reach to 70-90% accounts for this variability.
To ensure protection of the ends of each line, Zone 2 relays are used. These are
typically set to cover 100% of the local line, plus 20% - 50% of the shortest adjacent
line. Zone 2 relays operate with a short time delay, which allows Zone 1 relays enough
time to clear the fault before reacting [18].
For the purposes of this experiment, Zone 1 relays have been set to cover 80% of
the line length. Zone 2 relays have been set to cover 100% of the line length, as well
as 20% of an adjacent line. These relays are configured to be uni-directional. Since
IEDs on either end of a line in the grid face inward, the middle 60% of each line is
6
Figure 1. Zone Distance Relays [1]
a region protected by overlapping Zone 1 distance relays. The first and last 20% of
each line is not protected by overlapping Zone 1 distance relays, but does fall within
the range of Zone 2 distance relays from adjacent lines.
Figure 1 is an illustration of distance relay protection. If a fault were to occur
at P1, it would fall outside of the radius of IED01’s Zone 1 distance, but within the
Zone 2 distance. P2 is an example of a fault within a Zone 2 distance, but on an
adjacent line.
2.3 Directional Relays
Current can flow in either direction in a power grid system. When a fault occurs
in a grid, the current will always flow towards the location of the fault. Since the role
of the IEDs is to detect these faults, directional relays are used to indicate which way
the current is flowing. The direction of the current is referred to from the perspective
of an IED, either down the line or towards the bus. For example, suppose a single
fault occurred in Figure 1, at P1. IEDs 01, 02, 04, and 06 would detect the current as
flowing down the line. IEDs 03, 05, and 07 would detect it flowing towards the bus.
7
2.4 Backup Protection
To minimize the risk of cascading failure described in 1.1, power systems often
employ backup protection [11, 19]. This typically comes in two forms: local and
remote backup protection.
With local backup protection, multiple relays of the same function operate in
parallel in the same station. A station could have multiple Zone 1 relays, as an
example. In doing so, all that is required for the correct operation to occur is for one
of the devices to function properly. The proximity of redundant devices minimizes
delays in the case of malfunction. However, this proximity has drawbacks as well.
While some malfunctions that systems face will affect devices individually, others will
have a greater scale. For example, extreme weather could disable an entire station,
making the use of local redundant devices ineffective.
Remote backup protection presents a balance to the strengths and weaknesses of
local protection. As the name implies, this form of backup protection involves devices
located at remote stations. An application of this has already been discussed, in the
form of Zone 2 relays. Having overlapping zones of responsibility originating from dif-
ferent transmission lines increases the chance of detecting faults despite malfunction.
By design, remote protection incorporates a time delay to allow local relays to react
first. This could be a disadvantage, because a fault can cause equipment damage in
the time it takes for the remote relay to react, if the primary protection fails.
Local and remote backup protection are used together, which gives a power grid
flexibility in protecting its assets. These redundant processes are not implemented
with the intent of preventing malfunction in a power system, but rather to increase
tolerance. In this context, tolerance refers to the ability of a backup protection system
to sustain varying levels of malfunction before the system can no longer properly
respond to a fault.
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2.5 The Wide-Area Backup Protection System
As described in previous research, the cyber-physical system examined in this
experiment is a “regional decentralized peer-to-peer negotiating WABP multi-agent
system” that incorporates “local and adjacent line, first and second zone, distance
protection and directional protection systems as well as fault states from additional
lines” [2]. The topographical structure of the WABPS was designed in resemblance
of the IEEE 14-Bus System, as seen in Figure 2. However, certain features of the
14-Bus system have been abstracted away.
For example, the 14-Bus system is composed of 14 buses and 17 transmission
lines. It also includes the use of generators and transformers. The model used here,
displayed in Figure 3, condenses some of the buses and lines. The dotted squares are
reduced to a single substation each. Additionally, the generators and transformers
have been removed. These abstractions have been made to minimize the effect of the
state-space explosion problem, which the model checking approach is vulnerable to.
Designing the most simplistic model as possible to verify for correctness is imperative
when using a model checker [20, 21, 22]. The WABPS modification of the IEEE
14-Bus system contains 10 buses (referred to as substations in the figure) and 15
lines.
Each of the 15 lines in the system has an IED positioned on either end, resulting
in a total of 30 IEDs. Each IED has a corresponding Line Decision Agent (LDA), and
each bus has a Regional Decision Agent (RDA). As the name suggests, these agents
make decisions on how to react when a fault in the grid occurs. Each LDA collects
information from the IEDs on its local and adjacent lines, through coordination with
the RDA, and performs calculations to determine whether or not the local line is
faulted. Adjacent in this context means that two lines share a bus. For example,
lines 1 and 3 are adjacent.
9
Figure 2. IEEE 14-Bus System [2]
10
Figure 3. WABPS Modified IEEE 14-Bus System [2]
More information about the role of LDAs and RDAs in the WABPS can be found
in [2]. For the purposes of this research, certain aspects of LDAs and RDAs have
again been abstracted away. For the WABPS model used here, IEDs utilize the three
protection relays discussed: the Zone 1 distance relay, Zone 2 distance relay, and
directional relay. In the scenario of a fault, the two IEDs on a line work together as
an LDA. The use of RDAs can be obfuscated for the intent of this research. Figure
4 displays how IEDs and LDAs are implemented in this model of the WABPS.
Figure 4. Relationship between IEDs and LDAs [1]
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2.6 Model Checking
Model checking is often used to support hardware and software development. For
complex technologies, especially those that are interdependent with other systems, it
is infeasible for a human to test all possible scenarios. The use of a model checker
allows engineers to examine how their systems operate under given sets of specifi-
cations. This can expose troublesome situations that the engineer wasn’t otherwise
aware of, such as deadlock or race conditions. While software errors may be seen as an
annoyance, there certainly are scenarios in which undetected bugs led to catastrophe.
For example, the Ariane-5 missile crashed less than minute after launch in 1996, due
to an unintentional integer overflow in the control software. Similarly, Intel suffered
from a bug in the calculation of a floating point unit in the early 90s. This mistake
cost about $475 million in processor replacements, as well as their reputation [21].
As a result of the damage caused by undiscovered software bugs, extensive re-
search has been conducted regarding the application of model checking techniques.
This idea of conducting thorough verification of complex software and hardware sys-
tems is commonly referred to as formal methods. Formal methods are backed by both
the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA). In an investigation conducted by FAA and NASA, the parties state
that “Formal methods should be a part of the education of every computer scientist
and software engineer, just as the appropriate branch of applied maths is a necessary
part of the education of all other engineers.”
Many companies presently follow that recommendation and incorporate formal
methods into their business. Amazon, for example, applies the model checker known
as TLA+ to Amazon Web Services [23]. SPIN specifically has been used in many real
world applications. For example, NASA has applied SPIN to verify critical software in
Mars Exploration Rovers and Deep Impact, the former of which is an ongoing mission.
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The software has also been used in an investigation regarding a malfunction of the
2005 Toyota Camry, as well as in verifying medical device transmission protocols [24].
2.7 SPIN
There are several types of IED malfunctions, many IEDs which could be affected,
and many locations in the grid where faults could occur. Evaluating how the WABPS
reacts to each possible scenario of malfunctions is a combinatorically massive feat,
for which a model checking approach is appropriate.
SPIN, a term which was initially created as an abbreviation of Simple PROMELA
Interpreter, is one such model checker. SPIN is typically not used to convey the
meaning of the acronym; rather, it is a stand-alone term for the name of the model
checker. PROMELA, similarly an abbreviation of Process MetaLanguage, is used to
model nondeterministic behavior in distributed systems. The creator of SPIN, Gerard
Holzmann, claims that “PROMELA is not a programming language. It is a language
for building verification models [20].”
Unlike conventional programming languages, PROMELA does not execute in a
linear fashion. For example, in C or Java, the first true condition under an ‘if’
statement will be executed. In PROMELA, these conditions are known as guard
statements. Any true guard statement can be executed, regardless of the order in
which they are written. Guard statements are often used to modify the same variables.
Due to shared memory and the nondeterministic manner in which these statements are
selected, different executions of PROMELA code will lead to different results. There
are two different modes in which SPIN can be used: simulation and verification.
In simulation mode, SPIN randomly selects a certain set of conditions and tests
them against a predefined verdict. If the system fails to meet the verdict under the
given set of conditions, a trail file is created that specifies exactly which steps were
13
taken that led to the failure. The user can also manually specify the set of conditions
met to see the results of that scenario. For example, suppose that in a PROMELA
file, there are two variables, x and y. Both x and y are integers that can take the
values between 1 and 100. The verdict set for the program is that both variables are
even numbers. In simulation mode, SPIN could randomly select x = 43 and y = 10.
SPIN would then compare these values to the verdict, determine that the scenario
failed, then leave a trail file mentioning which values for each variable were selected.
This is one simulation run. This, of course, is a very simple example of SPIN might be
used. In practice, SPIN would be used to evaluate much more comprehensive models.
In verification mode, SPIN conducts a simulation run for each possible combina-
tion that the model can attain. As the name implies, it is used to verify the correctness
of a model. Keeping with the current example, SPIN would evaluate all combinations
of 1 ≤ x ≤ 100 and 1 ≤ y ≤ 100.
While SPIN (and the model checking approach in general) provides great utility
in verifying models for correctness, there are limitations that one should take into
consideration. One limitation, as mentioned previously, is the state-space explosion
problem. System verification can be extremely resource intensive, as investigated
in [25]. In the simple example with x and y, there are 10,000 possible simulation
runs to evaluate. In a model with more variables, there could very easily be several
million possible states. Beyond the issue of simply waiting a long period of time for
verification mode to finish, the computer could run out of memory before completion.
With this in mind, one should take caution when using SPIN on a complex model.
Possible solutions would be to verify small pieces of the model individually, or to
introduce abstractions. This presents an issue of balance, as a model should be
detailed enough to convey the properties of the real system, yet not so detailed that
it is too large to be evaluated thoroughly.
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This balance between detail and abstraction in a model is a segue to the next
limitation, which is that this approach of system verification only verifies the system
model, not the actual system. For this reason, one should be careful when designing
the model to ensure that it accurately represents the system. Limiting factors and
abstractions made in the model should be thoroughly explained. As the authors
of [21] state, “any verification using model-based techniques is only as good as the
model of the system.” Additionally, when analyzing and making conclusions from the
results of model checking, one should avoid extrapolation. Patterns observed from
using this approach could be predictive of real world behavior, but are not necessarily
indicative.
2.8 Related Work
The model checking approach is commonly used in various areas of research in
present day. Petri Nets are one such example, in which mathematical modeling is
used to verify system correctness. While not quite as powerful as other forms of
model checkers, they have been used in research regarding power system analysis
[26, 27, 28]. Bayesian networks, also used for the research of fault diagnosis for power
systems in [29], are another verification tool. Other researchers employ Markovian
Models [30, 31], or PRISM [32] for similar purposes.
SPIN has been widely recognized and applied since its introduction in 1991. It was
awarded the ACM System Software Award in 2002 [24]. The most recent version was
released in December 2018. It’s been used by researchers in recent years for deadlock
detection in the scheduling of autonomous vehicles [33], as well as to verify the status
protocol of network nodes [34].
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III. Methodology
This chapter covers how the testing of the WABPS is conducted. In this exper-
iment, different types of component and IED failures are simulated in the grid to
determine whether or not the WABPS is able to properly locate a fault for a number
of scenarios. The component and IED failures resemble errors that could occur from
real-life factors. Limitations of the model are stated, as well as assumptions made to
reduce the problem space.
3.1 Variables
There are two independent variables in this experiment: component failures and
total IED failures. The dependent variable is how many times the WABPS incorrectly
diagnoses a fault for each combination of component/IED failures.
Component Failures.
Component failures are representative of real life malfunctions that could occur
due to transmission error, faulty equipment, malicious activity, or any other reason.
For example, an IED fails to detect a fault where one occurs, an IED detects a
fault where one does NOT occur, or an IED doesn’t collect any data at all [13]. A
component failure is simulated in the grid by changing the initialized state of a single
relay for an IED to an incorrect state. The possible states for protection relays are
listed in Tables 1 and 2. An example of a simulated component failure would be
changing an IED’s Zone 1 distance relay state from “FAULT” to “NO FAULT.”
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Directional Relay States
LINE FAULT Line side fault detected
BUS FAULT Bus side fault detected
NO FAULT No fault detected
NO DATA No data received
Table 1. Directional Relay States
Zone Distance Relay States
FAULT Fault detected
NO FAULT No fault detected
NO DATA No data received
Table 2. Zone Distance Relay States
Total IED Failures.
Total IED failures are representative of real life scenarios where an IED is rendered
completely inoperative. These situations could occur as a result of extreme weather,
cyber-based attacks, or vandalism [35, 36]. Since a total IED failure resembles a
situation in which the device cannot contribute any information, it is simulated in
the grid by changing the states of all three relays for an IED to “NO DATA.”
3.2 Configurations
This thesis directly follows the research of [13] and [1]. In the former, SPIN
was applied to see how the model checking approach could be used to assess the
reliability of the WABPS. Only Line 15 was tested, with the assumption that it was
representative of any line in the grid. In the latter, the model was improved by
incorporating more potential relay states to examine resiliency. Additionally, all 15
lines in the grid were tested. In both of these previous works, one of the limiting
assumptions was that faults occurred only within the overlapping Zone 1 relays on
each line. This research specifically focuses on the more vulnerable regions outside
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of the overlapping Zone 1 relays. Since there are 15 lines, and two regions on each
line to test (the first and last 20% of each line), there are 30 total line segments in
which faults are simulated to occur. Each location is notated by the line number and
either the letter “a” or “b.” “a” refers to the end of the line with the lower numbered
IED, while “b” refers to the end with the higher numbered IED. For example, Line
1a refers to the region on Line 1 on the end with IED 1. A portion of the WABPS,
specifically Line 1, is shown again in Figure 5 for the reader’s convenience.
For each of those 30 locations, SPIN is run in verification mode, as described below,
for all combinations of 0 to 3 component failures and 0 to 3 total IED failures. This is
to examine how resilient the WABPS is in face of different levels of malfunction. The
range of 0 to 3 is used because it gives a good spread of results. As one might expect,
the WABPS fails in almost every trial if it experiences too many malfunctions. Since
a failure rate of nearly 100% is resource intensive and not useful to the researcher,
the combination of failures is kept to a low to moderate rate.
The number of scenarios in which the WABPS misdiagnoses a fault for each region
and each configuration of component and IED failures is recorded. It should be noted
that a scenario is recorded when any line in the grid is misdiagnosed, not necessarily
the faulted line. For example, suppose a fault is simulated in the region of Line 6a. If
the WABPS correctly identifies that fault, but mistakenly identifies a fault somewhere
else on the grid, it is counted as a scenario failure.
Figure 5. Line 1
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3.3 Simulation Run
This experiment is conducted by running SPIN in verification mode, which iterates
through all possible simulation runs. Each run is performed in the following manner.
1. A fault is assumed to occur at a specified location in the WABPS (Line 1a-
15b). The protection relays for all 30 IEDs are initialized in PROMELA to
their proper values in response to the fault. For example, suppose the fault
is simulated within the Line 1a region. IEDs 1 and 2 would both have the
directional relay set to “LINE FAULT.” IED 1 would have both distance relays
set to “FAULT.” IED 2 would have the Zone 1 relay set to “NO FAULT,” and
the Zone 2 relay set to “FAULT.” The other 28 IEDs are set according to their
position relative to the fault.
2. The conditions to verify for correctness are set. Each of the 15 LDAs has a
verdict indicating whether its corresponding line contained the fault or not.
3. A specified number of protection relays experience a component failure. A
random IED is selected. A random relay is selected for that IED. Then, that
relay is changed to a random value. This is repeated for the specified number
of component failures.
4. A specified number of IEDs experience a total IED failure. A random IED is
selected. All three relays for that IED are changed to “NO DATA.” This is
repeated for the specified number of total IED failures.
5. PROMELA calculates several factors using the now modified state of all IEDs.
Each LDA uses these factors to make a conclusive statement on whether or not
its respective line was faulted. The logic behind this algorithm is discussed in
detail in 4.1.
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6. The decision that each LDA made is then compared to the verdict defined
earlier. If all 15 LDAs were correct, the WABPS succeeded in reacting to the
fault, and the simulation stops here. If any LDA was incorrect, the scenario is
counted as a failure.
7. If the simulation was not a success, SPIN leaves a trail file indicating which
configurations led to this result, as well as exactly what steps each LDA took in
the decision making process. For example, Line 1a was tested for one component
failure and one total IED failure. A code snippet from one of the trail files left
by SPIN is displayed in Figure 6. These files range between 200 to 300 lines
in length, thus only the first few lines are included. This file indicates that the
combination of IED 3’s Zone 2 relay changing to “FAULT” and IED 1 turning
off was sufficient enough to cause to WABPS to come to an incorrect decision
on locating the fault.
This is one execution for a specified region, number of component failures, and
number of total IED failures. SPIN continues until ALL possible combinations of
relay state and IED failures for the given specification have been selected.
3.4 Limitations
With the SPIN settings used in this experiment, a simulation run is finished once
either all predetermined verdicts have been validated, or until one fails. A simulation
run will not continue once it is determined that the conditions for a single verdict
Figure 6. Trail File Snippet
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have not been met. In the context of this research, if a particular scenario would
result in three LDAs coming to the wrong conclusion for their lines, the simulation
stops after only one. Not only will SPIN determine the incorrect reading of just one
line, but it will do so for whichever line happens to be calculated first.
This has pros and cons. It is beneficial, because it greatly speeds up the process
of verification. If a simulation fails, SPIN immediately moves on to the next one,
similar to a ‘continue’ condition in a for/while loop in programming. The downside
is that it presents each simulation run with a binary result. Either a run failed, or
it did not. This prevents one from investigating the extent of failure to which a
simulation run achieves. The WABPS is said to fail the strong correctness test if any
line is misdiagnosed, while it fails the weak correctness test only if the faulted line is
misdiagnosed. With this distinction, one can differentiate severe failures from those
that are merely annoyances. The application of SPIN in this experiment does not
separate the two types of correctness failures, so the results may make the WABPS
appear to be more vulnerable than it actually is. Future work could entail redefining
the SPIN settings and investigating strong vs. weak correctness failures.
This experiment does not incorporate the use of Zone 3 relays, nor does it account
for the back reach of distance relays. Both abstractions are made to reduce the
problem space. These aspects of relay protection could potentially be added to the
model in future work, though it would amplify the currently existing vulnerability of
this experiment to the state-space explosion problem.
3.5 Assumptions
All faults are assumed to occur on the ends of each line, outside of the overlapping
Zone 1 relays. This assumption is not made to reduce the complexity of the problem,
but rather because these regions have not been tested in the previous research. Inves-
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tigating how the WABPS reacts to faults in these areas is of interest because it now
activates Zone 2 relays from neighboring lines, which previously was not the case.
All transmission lines are assumed to be the same length. This assumption is
specifically made to normalize the reach of Zone 2 relays. In practice, Zone 2 relays
protect 100% of the local line length plus 20% of the shortest adjacent line, not
necessarily 20% of each specific adjacent line. Thus, a short transmission line will
have more of its area covered by neighboring Zone 2 relays than a longer transmission
line. Given that the IEEE 14-Bus system is a model topography, not a diagram of a
physical implementation, the length of each transmission line is undefined. For the
simplicity of having each Zone 2 relay cover the same distance, transmission lines in
the grid are left as an undefined, yet equal, length in this experiment.
Lastly, directional relays are assumed to be able to detect faults in the WABPS
with no regard to proximity. A directional relay implemented in a real world applica-
tion will naturally have a prescribed range of effectiveness. The signal received from
faults occurring outside of that operating range will grow increasingly weak as the
distance grows, to the point that a directional relay will be unable to detect that a
fault has occurred at all. Incorporating an effective range for directional relays would
run into the same issue as before; the transmission lines do not have a defined length.
Thus, directional relays in this experiment are intended to detect any fault within
the grid despite location.
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IV. Results & Analysis
Line 13b
Component
0 1 2 3
Total IED
0 0 35 9,938 69,226
1 5 2,353 99,149 108,067
2 138 46,874 109,597 128,622
3 1,825 116,325 129,087 160,365
Table 3. Line 13b Results
Table 3 displays results for Line 13b. While the experiment was completed for all
thirty regions, only one is included for brevity. Beyond the aspect of brevity, there is
no need for further data compilation. Analysis can be conducted with minimal data,
considering that one line in the grid is representative of any line. The x-axis represents
the number of component failures specified for a verification check in SPIN, while the
y-axis represents the number of total IED failures. The numbers in the table are the
amount of simulation runs in which the WABPS was unable to properly diagnose
all lines in the grid for the given configuration. For example, SPIN used verification
mode with the specification of one component failure and one total IED failure and
found 2,353 simulation runs in which the WABPS was unsuccessful in reacting to a
fault in the Line 13b region.
The process in which PROMELA determines whether or not the WABPS can
properly clear the fault is entirely deterministic. Thus, one should expect to receive
the exact same results upon repeated verification runs. However, there may be vari-
ations in the number of failures reported across simulations. This is primarily due
to the mathematical complexity of this research problem. Certain configurations of
malfunctions will have hundreds of thousands of potential scenarios. In cases like
these, the computer could very well likely run out of memory and terminate before
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all scenarios have been evaluated. Despite imperfect testing conditions, results should
be similar enough between verification runs to draw conclusions.
4.1 Black Box Approach to Analysis
A few observations can be made from inspecting these results. First, the com-
bination of zero component/IED failures led to zero scenarios in which the WABPS
was unsuccessful. This should be expected, since the system is supposed to function
perfectly when there aren’t any malfunctions. While it seems trivial in this case,
this detail can be useful early in the model checking process, when ensuring that the
model designed satisfies the properties for correctness.
The table above is useful for giving a quantifiable value of how resilient the WABPS
is with varying levels of stress. However, equally significant are the trail files left
by SPIN, due to their utility for the researchers. For example, consider the effect
that each of the two variables have on the outcome. When comparing the effect of
component failures vs. total IED failures, it’s clear that component failures result in
significantly more simulations where the WABPS is unable to function properly. This
initially seems counter-intuitive, as a single total IED failure affects three protective
relays, while a component failure only affects one.
The reason for this stems from how each variable affects the system. A total IED
failure changes all three relays to “NO DATA,” while a component failure can change
the relay to any other value. This indicates that LDAs are much more likely to come
to the incorrect decision as a result of receiving false information than receiving no
information at all.
An examination of the trail files shines some insight as to why this occurs. One
behavior observed is that each LDA incorporates the least amount of information
possible when making its decision. If an LDA is confident on the status of its line
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after compiling the information from its two IEDs, then the decision making process
stops here. An LDA only consults neighboring lines if it did not gather enough
information from its two IEDs to confidently decide.
In application, this isn’t necessarily a bad thing. If a fault occurs on a line, the
circuit breaker should be notified as quickly as possible to trip the line, so that damage
to the equipment is minimized. Within the scope of this experiment, this tendency
to decide as quickly as possible is a noticeable issue. It leads to simulations in which
an LDA receives false data and immediately decides, whereas it could have come to
the correct decision had it gathered information from adjacent lines. This is a strong
conclusion that can now be used to improve the resiliency of the model.
There remains many conclusions to be made from analyzing the trail files. For
example, which types of component failures are more likely to cause a failed simulation
run, or comparing the number of false positives to false negatives. However, the black
box approach to analyzing results was only used in this section to show that the model
checking approach makes it possible to do so. Given that the internal workings of the
WABPS are known to the researcher, it is much more practical to take a white box
approach to analysis, which is discussed next.
4.2 Decision Making Process
Up until this point, the research conducted has been in setting up an appropriate
model such that the WABPS can be evaluated with the model checking approach.
Next, the results of this initial phase of the experiment are used to improve the model
to make the system more fault tolerant. To do so, a further examination of the logic
behind each LDA is required. This section covers Step 5 of the simulation run in 3.3.
For clarity, it is broken up into three steps.
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Finding the Fault Value.
First, each IED calculates an Action Factor (AF). The AF is an aggregate of the
information that each IED collects from its three relays. A higher AF indicates a
higher threat of a fault on the IED’s local line.
• If both the directional and Zone 1 relays of an IED detect a fault on the local
line, then AF = 2, regardless of the status of the Zone 2 relay.
• If both the directional and Zone 2 relays of an IED detect a fault on the local
line, but the Zone 1 relay doesn’t, then AF = 1.
• If the directional relay does not indicate a fault on the local line, and neither
of the distance relays detect a fault, then AF = −2.
• If there is any other combination of the three protection relays, then AF = 0.
AF Directional Relay Zone 1 Zone 2
2 LINE FAULT FAULT ANY
1 LINE FAULT NO FAULT FAULT
-2 BUS FAULT or NO FAULT NO FAULT NO FAULT
0 Any other combination
Table 4. Action Factor Calculation
The calculation of an IED’s Action Factor is summarized in Table 4. Each LDA
takes the sum of the two AFs determined on its line. This new factor is the line’s
Fault Value, Fout(i). From here, Fout(i) is used to determine the state of the line.
There are four possible states - fault, suspect, special, and normal. Fault and normal
are end states, while suspect and special are transitional states.
• If F out(i) > 2, the line is in the fault state.
• If F out(i) = 2, the line is in the suspect state.
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• If 0 ≤ F out(i) < 2, the line is in the special state.
• If F out(i) < 0, the line is in the normal state.
When a line is in one of the end states, the LDA is confident enough to make
a decision regarding the status of its line, and PROMELA moves on to Step 6 in
the simulation run. Either a fault has occurred on the line (fault) or one has not
occurred on the line (normal). If the line is in one of the transitional states, the
LDA was unable to gather sufficient information from its local IEDs, so it consults
neighboring lines before coming to a decision.
Resolving the Special state.
If a line is in the special state, each IED on that line calculates a Certification
Factor (CF), displayed in 1. The CF is a measure of how directional relays on neigh-
boring lines report the flow of the current. If most of the directional relays from
neighboring lines indicate current flowing towards the local line, there is more reason
to believe that is where the fault is located.
CF =
i
n
=

≥ 0.5 convert to suspect
< 0.5 convert to normal
(1)
The total number of IEDs on neighboring lines is represented by the variable n.
The number of those IEDs whose directional relay points towards the local line is
represented by the variable i. If both IEDs on a line in the special state have CFs
that are greater than or equal to 0.5, the line converts to the suspect state. If at least
one IED on the line has a CF less than 0.5, the line is set to the normal state.
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Resolving the Suspect State.
If a line is in the suspect state, the WABPS waits to make a decision until the
states of all neighboring lines have been resolved. A process of elimination is then
used to determine where the fault occurred. There are three cases that could occur:
• One of the neighboring lines was determined to be in the fault state.
• All of the neighboring lines were determined to be in the normal state.
• One of the neighboring lines was also determined to be in the suspect state.
In the first case, the local line is deemed to be in the normal state. In the second
case, the local line is deemed to be in the fault state. In the third case, the two
suspect lines need to be compared to each other. The first comparison is the fault
value. The line with the larger Fout is determined to be the faulted line, while the
other is clear. If the two lines have an equal Fout, the distance relays of each line’s
IEDs are compared. The line which has more relays set to “FAULT” converts to the
fault state, while the other moves into the normal state. It is not possible for two
neighboring lines with same number of distance relays activated to have made it this
far into the decision making process, thus all possible scenarios have been accounted
for.
4.3 Types of Failures
Now that the algorithm the WABPS uses has been discussed, the types of system
failures can be further examined. Scenarios in which the WABPS incorrectly identified
an unfaulted line (false positives) are referred to as Type I failures. Scenarios in which
a faulted line was not identified (false negatives) are referred to as Type II failures.
This section is divided into the three possible initialization states that a line can have
in the experiment.
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Faulted Lines.
Consider the malfunctions required for any given faulted line to be incorrectly
diagnosed as safe. The only possible scenario in which this could occur is if
F out(i) < 0
Suppose that a faulted line does not fulfill this condition, and ends up in the
suspect state. It cannot be incorrectly diagnosed as normal at this point, because
that would require a neighboring line to be in the fault state. If so, the simulation
run would have already been concluded due to a false verdict. Thus, we can narrow
down the combinations leading to a false positive. Table 5 shows the starting values
for IEDs on a faulted line.
Directional Relay Zone 1 Zone 2 AF
IED X LINE FAULT FAULT FAULT 2
IED Y LINE FAULT NO FAULT FAULT 1
Table 5. Initialization of IEDs on the Faulted Line
For F out(i) < 0 to be true, a minimum of three malfunctions must occur. Initially,
IED X has AF = 2, while IED Y has AF = 1. If IED X has its directional relay
changed to either “BUS FAULT” or “NO FAULT,” and both of its distance relays
changed to “FAULT,” then AF = −2. F out(i) = −1, which is sufficient for the line to
transition to the normal state. This requires three component failures. Alternatively,
IED X could suffer a total IED failure, while IED Y changes its values to those
required for AF = −2. This requires 1 total IED failure and 2 component failures.
The discovery that a Type II failure can only occur with at least 3 malfunctions,
and only specific sets of at least 3 malfunctions, leads to the conclusion that the
WABPS is more fault tolerant than upon initial inspection. While results in the
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range of hundreds of thousands may initially seem disparaging, it’s clear that a vast
majority of those scenarios are false positives. System failures are equivalent from
the perspective of SPIN, but they are not equal in practical applications. Tripping
a transmission line that was working properly could be costly, but the consequences
are much lower compared to the equipment damage caused by a faulted line left
unchecked.
Proximal Lines.
In this context, a proximal line is any non-faulted neighboring line to the faulted
line which has one of the Zone 2 relays activated. Consider the malfunctions required
for a proximal line to be misdiagnosed as one that is faulted. Table 6 shows the
starting values of the IEDs on a line of this type.
Directional Relay Zone 1 Zone 2 AF
IED X LINE FAULT NO FAULT FAULT 1
IED Y BUS FAULT NO FAULT NO FAULT -2
Table 6. Initialization of IEDs on an Proximal Line
A proximal line, with F out(i) = −1, can suffer from a Type I failure in two
scenarios.
F out(i) > 2
0 ≤ F out(i) ≤ 2
Meeting the first condition guarantees that a Type I failure will occur. This
condition can be met with a minimum of only two component failures. If IED Y’s di-
rectional relay changes to “LINE FAULT,” and its Zone 1 relay changes to “FAULT,”
the action factor will raise from -2 to 2, thus F out(i) > 2. These two malfunctions
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together are sufficient for the line to be placed in the fault state. If either IED on the
line faces a total IED failure, this condition cannot be met.
Meeting the second condition makes a Type I failure likely, but does not guarantee
it. This condition can be met with a fewer number of malfunctions. 0 ≤ F out(i) ≤ 2
can be fulfilled by a single total IED failure or a single component failure. There are
eight possible single malfunctions that would raise the Fout(i) to the specified range.
For example, a total IED failure for IED Y, or changing the Zone 1 relay for IED X
to “FAULT.” The line either goes to the suspect state, or is diagnosed as normal, in
which case it is not a Type I failure. In the suspect state, success is only possible
if the line is adjacent to the faulted line. If so, the proximal line in question will
be properly diagnosed as normal. If the proximal line is not adjacent to the faulted
line, two things can occur. Either all of its neighbors were diagnosed as normal, thus
misdiagnosing it as faulted, or at least one of its neighbors was also put in the suspect
state. In the second case, either the local line or the neighboring suspect line will be
misdiagnosed as faulted.
Distal Lines.
In this context, distal refers to any line either not adjacent to the faulted line, or an
adjacent line with neither of the Zone 2 relays activated. Consider the malfunctions
required for a distal line to be misdiagnosed as one that is faulted. Table 7 shows the
starting values of the IEDs on a line of this type.
Directional Relay Zone 1 Zone 2 AF
IED X LINE FAULT NO FAULT NO FAULT 0
IED Y BUS FAULT NO FAULT NO FAULT -2
Table 7. Initialization of IEDs on a Distal Line
As with proximal lines, there are two conditions that could cause a Type I failure
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for a distal line.
F out(i) > 2
0 ≤ F out(i) ≤ 2
Since the initialization between a proximal line and a distal line only differs by
the value of a single distance relay, the circumstances in which they are misdiagnosed
are very similar. The minimum number of malfunctions required to meet the first
condition is three, instead of two. The number of single malfunctions that would
meet the second condition is still eight.
Due to how easily non-faulted lines can be misdiagnosed, it’s clear that the ma-
jority of failures reported in the results are Type I, not Type II. With this in mind,
the proposed revision to the decision making process, discussed next, specifically
addresses some of the vulnerable scenarios non-faulted lines face.
4.4 Revision to the Algorithm
Now that the causes of failure have been analyzed, the next step is to make
improvements to the model to increase its resiliency. One suggestion is to make a
small adjustment to how the Action Factor of an IED is calculated. Currently, any
IED with a directional relay reporting a line side fault and an activated Zone 1 relay
will have AF = 2. This is independent of the Zone 2 relay reading. Assigning the
highest possible AF while only considering two out of the three relays is rash and
leads to many of the Type II failures previously examined. Table 8 shows proposed
values for calculation of the Action Factor.
A table with proposed values for calculation of the Action Factor is shown below.
This proposed table restricts the conditions necessary for an IED to be assigned
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AF Directional Relay Zone 1 Zone 2
2 LINE FAULT FAULT FAULT
1 LINE FAULT FAULT NO FAULT
1 LINE FAULT NO FAULT FAULT
-2 BUS FAULT or NO FAULT NO FAULT NO FAULT
0 Any other combination
Table 8. Proposed Action Factor Calculation
an Action Factor of 2. In turn, this will lead to noticeably fewer situations in which
component failures cause lines to be incorrectly diagnosed as faulted. It should be
noted that the second row in the table (an addition) can’t normally be achieved
by an IED. If a Zone 1 relay has been activated, then the Zone 2 relay by default
has also been activated since it covers a greater area. Thus, this possibility can
only be achieved as a result of component failure. This ties back to the approach
of adversarial thinking. By expecting lines to mistakenly fulfill this condition, and
reducing the ramifications of the condition, less failures should occur. With this in
mind, the added row should only help the system in preventing false positives, and
should not deter it from correctly identifying positives. To see how significant this
proposed change is in the system’s fault tolerance, the experiment will be conducted
again using the new Action Factor calculation.
4.5 Revised Results
Line 13b
Component
0 1 2 3
Total IED
0 0 (-0) 30 (-5) 8,559 (-1,379) 61,609 (-7,617)
1 5 (-0) 2,230 (-123) 92,535 (-6,614) 101,158 (-6,909)
2 138 (-0) 45,645 (-1,229) 106,449 (-3,148) 118,498 (-10,124)
3 1,825 (-0) 113,742 (-2,583) 127,070 (-2,017) 127,199 (-33,166)
Table 9. Line 13b Revised Results
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Table 9 displays the results of testing the WABPS again with the proposed revi-
sions. The first number in each cell is the number of failed simulation runs for each
configuration, as in Table 3. The number in parentheses is the difference between the
new results and the old. For example, the verification run with two component fail-
ures led to 8,559 failed simulation runs, which is 1,379 less than previously reported.
As expected, the number of failure scenarios is slightly lower than in the previous
iteration.
The change in the Action Factor calculation made one specific contribution leading
to the increased fault tolerance of the system. As discussed in 4.3, the minimum
number of component failures previously necessary for F out(i) > 2 for Proximal lines
was two. This was possible if IED Y’s directional relay changed to indicate a line
side fault and if the Zone 1 relay activated. These two malfunctions give the IEDs
on the line Action Factors of 1 and 2, whose sum is high enough for a Type I failure.
However, this same combination of malfunctions under the new calculation results in
Action Factors of 1 and 1, whose sum is NOT high enough for a Type I failure. Thus,
the minimum number of component failures required for this condition is raised from
two to three, a clear indication of increased resiliency.
It is apparent from the results that the revision led to less system failures in sce-
narios where the model only had one component error. This is due to the set of
circumstances discussed in 4.3 that could lead Proximal/Distal lines to meet the sec-
ond condition, 0 ≤ F out(i) ≤ 2. The revision reduces the number of single component
failures leading to the second condition from eight to seven.
The contribution to the WABPS from this thesis slightly increased its fault toler-
ance. Further improvements are certainly possible, yet would likely require a different
approach to problem solving. The Action Factor calculation was designed to be adap-
tive, allowing the system to react to various combinations of malfunctions. As it is
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already quite efficient in detecting faults, further improvements would be in the form
of expanding the model, rather than revising it. For example, incorporating the use
of Zone 3 relays in the Action Factor calculation. While a third distance relay would
no doubt improve the WABPS’ fault tolerance, it would also significantly increase the
complexity of the problem space. Other such additions to the model would be just
as computationally intensive.
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V. Conclusion
5.1 Contributions
In this thesis, a backup protection system employing autonomous agents to achieve
wide area communication is stress-tested. Various types and levels of real-life mal-
function are represented as component and IED failures. The backup protection
system’s response to a fault is then modeled, with the malfunctions incorporated.
Each of the 15 Line Decision Agents in the system performs a decentralized, logical
decision making process to determine whether or not it was able to properly diagnose
the line for a fault. Due to the countless number of combinations of malfunctions
and fault locations, the SPIN model checker was used to iterate through all pos-
sible scenarios. With results compiled, the logic behind the algorithm was broken
down to examine exactly what combinations of malfunctions led to failed simulation
runs. Specific vulnerabilities of the backup protection system were then uncovered.
The logic behind the algorithm was slightly modified, which increased the number of
malfunctions required for a specific failure scenario from two to three. Allowing the
backup protection system to face a higher level of adversity while still being able to
operate correctly is a clear indication of improved fault tolerance.
5.2 Review of Research Questions
• RQ1: How can the model checking approach be applied to test the fault tolerance
of the WABPS?
The WABPS was tested through the use of the PROMELA model which deter-
mined theoretical responses to various fault scenarios. SPIN, used in verification
mode, executed all possible scenarios and recorded simulation runs in which the
system was unable to properly respond to the fault.
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• RQ2: What specific vulnerabilities lie within the WABPS?
Specific vulnerabilities were analysed in 4.3. Categorizing lines in the system
into Faulted, Proximal, and Distal lines allowed for further examination of vul-
nerability. The initialization for each type of line was discussed, as well as which
Fault Values resulted in incorrect verdicts. With the conditions listed for incor-
rect verdicts, the number and type of malfunctions required for each condition
were studied.
• RQ3: Using the model checking approach, what improvements can be made to
the model to increase its resiliency?
In RQ2, specific combinations of malfunctions leading to simulation failures
were uncovered. With these in consideration, a revision was made to the logic
behind the PROMELA model to increase the system’s resiliency. SPIN was
used again to show that the WABPS did indeed become more fault tolerant.
5.3 Future Work
As mentioned in Chapter 3, many assumptions and limitations were necessary to
focus on the problem space of this research. Future work could entail tackling one of
these areas to improve the model.
• Incorporate further sources of backup protection. Section 2.4 detailed local and
remote backup protection. The current model does not embody the idea of
local backup protection at all. This could be added in by having a Zone 1 relay,
and a backup Zone 1 relay. An example Action Factor calculation table for
this is proposed in [1]. Remote backup protection can be expanded on through
the use of Zone 3 distance relays. Tertiary distance protection is commonly
implemented in real life, but is not present in the current PROMELA model.
37
Admittedly, this avenue of future work could prove to be troublesome. Adding
more protection relays to each IED would broaden an already complex model
making it more resource-intensive to perform verification runs on.
• Find a way to differentiate between strong and weak correctness failures. As
covered in 3.4, SPIN does not allow for simulation runs to continue once a
verdict is violated. Weak correctness failures overlap with strong failures. Thus,
a simulation run can pass the weak correctness test, but fail the strong test. It
is currently not possible to tell how many strong correctness failures would have
passed the weakness test, which could be useful information when evaluating
the extent of failure of the WABPS.
• Define the length of transmission lines in the system. 3.5 discloses that lines in
the model are of an arbitrary, but equal, length. This abstraction is made so
that the operating range of Zone 2 relays and directional relays are simplified.
This line of future work would make the model much more realistic.
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